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OPEN OFFERS AND SHAREHOLDERS EARNINGS – EVIDENCE FROM INDIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become a popular vehicle for domestic as 
well as international companies to rapidly access new markets, assets and capabilities. This 
motivates us to study the impact of open offers on shareholders returns in the Indian context.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study computes simple stock returns (R), market 
returns (M), abnormal returns (AR), security returns variability (SRV) and apply the analysis 
of variance (ANOVA – one way) to locate any significant differences among the means of 
stock returns during pre and post substantial acquisition offer announcement.  
 
Findings: The findings indicate that there exist significant negative returns during post 
announcement period.  Though, positive returns observe in short period after the immediate 
acquisition of shares. In contrast, we also observe that AAR & CAR notices lower returns and 
security returns variability (SRV) becomes proportionate to AAR and CAR.   
 
Research limitations: The research period 2007-10 is not long enough, so the acquisition 
effect if any, on target firms would not be apparent. During global financial crisis, the market 
sentiments and investor perception towards stocks have not favorable and do not considered.   
 
Practical implications: The research work may helps stock brokers, M&A advisory and 
regulatory bodies while designing takeover and open offer policies.  
 
Originality/Value: We compute SRV along with abnormal returns to find any correlation sets 
during pre and post acquisition period. This is an original contribution undertake open offers 
and shareholders earnings in the emerging markets era, say India.  
 
Keywords: Mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, open offers, earnings management, event study 
Paper type: Research paper 
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1.0. Introduction 
orporate restructuring and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are big part of the 
corporate finance world. The key principle behind buying a company is to create 
shareholder value over and above that of the sum of the two companies (Pandey, 2009; Ray, 
2010). Mergers are regarded as one of the activities to pursue business expansion, conversely 
a tool for external growth in contrast to internal growth. The recent phenomenal boom in 
M&A would surge in the near future because of open trade policies and hence more 
companies are adopting and forming strategic alliances in order to compete with 
internationalized world and to maintain their market shares. 
 
The economy of India which was hitherto controlled and regulated by the Government is set 
free to grab new opportunities offering in the world. In this scenario, M&A is one of the best 
options available to the corporate for inorganic growth as a choice of stakeholders’ earnings. 
M&A boom in India has been comprised exclusively of friendly deals and since its economic 
liberalization in 1991; it has experienced only a handful of hostile takeover attempts 
(Machiraju, 2007; Nangia et al., 2011). Taking this is an opportunity, we presents a critical 
research report on shareholders returns in reference to announcement of open offers in the 
Indian context. We consider 187 open offers during 2007-10 and proves that the stock returns 
tumble during post offer announcement period. Further, it would become a literary 
contribution and evidence from the Indian capital market. Moreover, this is an original 
investigation which is contributing the evidence on Indian stock returns in reference to open 
offers announcement. 
 
In India, the regulatory framework governing domestic & multinational agreements and 
acquisitions has gradually evolved in 1990s. Before 1990, open offer is mandatory for 
acquiring 25 per cent stake in a company. Subsequently, the threshold limit was reduced to 
10 per cent of company’s capital. Consequently, SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares & 
Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 has been enacted by the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India which deals with acquisition of shares, open offers and takeovers (Machiraju, 2007; 
Ray, 2010; Reddy et al., 2011). 
 
Historically, merger activity born in the United States, that first wave occurred in the early 
part of the 20
th
 century, the second wave coincided the bull market in1920s, when firms again 
embarked on acquisitions as a way of extending their reach into new markets and expanding 
C 
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market share, the third wave occurred in 1960s, with the intent of diversifying and forming 
conglomerates. And the fourth wave of mergers occurred in the mid 1980s, where firms were 
acquired primarily for restructuring assets and recapitalization (Weston, Chung and Hoag, 
1998). During 1990s, mergers were in telecommunications, entertainment and financial 
services, as firms consolidated to meet new market and technological challenges (Pawaskar, 
2001; Kumar and Rajib, 2007; Ray, 2010). The transformational change and focus of 
consolidation shifted to the high technology and internet sectors, later those firms 
increasingly using their own stock as currency to finance acquisitions. 
 
Today’s global economy is characterized by multi-directional flows of products, services, 
people, ideas and capital. The new forms of alliances are guaranteeing the long-term 
sustainable achievement of fast profitable growth for their business (Pawaskar, 2001; Kumar 
and Rajib, 2007). According to Ernst & Young, the rise in consumer demand in India over 
the last couple of years driven by a recovering economy, which is witnessing heightened 
levels of interest from both private equity (PE) and M&A. Mergers have crossed a little over 
$10bn with 267 deals for the period Jan-Dec 2009, out of these 142 were domestic deals 
(nearly $6bn) and 125 cross-border deals (pegged at $4bn), which includes both outbound 
and inbound investments in India (Ernst & Young, 2009). According to Grand Thornton, 
these transactions more than doubled and recording a marked revival in deal activity as 439 
M&A and PE transactions have been announced between Jan-May, 2010 compared to 179 in 
2009 (Grand Thornton, 2010; Nangia et al., 2011; Reddy et al., 2011). The number of 
substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers during 1997-2009 expresses in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the review of earlier 
literature (both global and Indian studies), section 3 explains the methodology, section 4 
describes data collection and analysis, section 5 reports the estimated results & discussions 
and finally conclusions depict in section 6. 
 
2.0. Review of former studies 
Many researchers have studied the effects of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers on the value 
of both target and bidder firms. Though, most of the studies present the effects of M&A 
announcements that focus on North America, European and Japanese markets, there were few 
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studies and their results shows optimistic abnormal returns in Asian markets. The earlier 
literature includes, application of event study approach to find stock returns (Asquith and 
Kim, 1982; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Chang, 1998; Thomas, Goh and Ybarra, 2007; Wong 
and Cheung, 2009; recent study by Eije and Wiegerinck, 2010), agency problems face by 
potential bidders (Chowdhry and Jegadeesh, 1994; Oswald and Young, 2008), merger 
negotiations (Kristensen, 2000), impact of restructuring announcements (Chan-Lau, 2002). In 
the Indian context, we found very few studies that mergers growth and foreign ownership 
(Beena, 2004), pre and post merger operating performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; 
Pawaskar, 2001; Kumar and Rajib, 2007). 
 
Asquith and Kim (1982) examine the returns to stock holders of target firms around the date 
of initial announcement or completion of a merger. They conclude that the stockholders of 
target firms gained, while bidding firms have not gain. Further, Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
review 13 studies on the abnormal returns around takeover announcements. They found that 
the average excess returns to target firms’ stockholders are of 30% and 20% for the 
successful tender offers and mergers, respectively; while bidding firms’ stockholders gain an 
average of 4% around tender offers but no abnormal return around the merger. 
 
Chang (1998) examines the bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when 
target firms were privately held. He indicates that bidders experienced no abnormal return in 
cash offers but a positive abnormal return in stock offers. Thomas, Goh and Ybarra (2007) 
determine the effect of poison pill adoption on long-term and short earnings forecasts by 
security analysts. The results provide no evidence of significant revisions in one-year or five-
year earnings forecasts following the adoption of poison pills. It also evidences that firms 
adopt poison pills following a period of significant negative revisions in earnings forecasts. 
Finally they suggest that poison pill adoptions may be response to downward revisions in 
earnings forecasts. 
 
Recently, Wong and Cheung (2009) reveals that whether firms involve in M&A activities to 
experience abnormal return around M&A announcement periods and tests if abnormal return 
on the stock holdings of these firms would be affected by the types of acquisition, the modes 
of payment or the types of target firms by using the data from six Asian key markets during 
2000-07. It concludes that there exist significantly negative average residuals for target firms 
around the M&A announcement period. Eije and Wiegerinck (2010) conclude the 
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announcement effects of cross-border acquisitions of private firms on short term bidders and 
stock market returns in the European Union. Investors of bidding companies react positively 
to private acquisition announcements in both China and US. Moreover, the bidder returns do 
not differ significantly between the two target markets. They find bidder market effects for 
the US: private acquisitions by civil law firms generate smaller bidder returns, while 
relatively large private acquisitions by common law firms increase such returns. 
  
Generally, potential bidders face agency problems due to government intervention and other 
informal groups’ participation in negations, Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994) model the 
strategic pre-tender offer share acquisition problem faced by potential bidders in takeovers. It 
provides a rational explanation for seemingly anomalous empirical evidence that the 
information about the impending tender offers is not fully converted through the potential 
bidders’ pre-tender offer trades and for the evidence that a large fraction of bidders do not 
hold any target shares prior to launching the tender offers. Further, Oswald and Young (2008) 
inspect the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms 
on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. It shows that repurchases 
substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders and 
that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are 
important factors stimulating such payouts. 
 
Kristensen (2000) describes the interview with two head negotiators of a buying and selling 
company in a Swedish takeover, a fair price was found to play an important role. The results 
show that both satisfaction with the offered selling price and willingness to buy were affected 
by information about a fair price. On the other hand, Chan-Lau (2002) evaluates the stock 
price impact of restructuring announcements before and after the commercial rehabilitation 
law implementation using event study analysis. He suggests an improvement in market 
credibility of restructuring announcements based on better disclosure, mergers and to a lesser 
extent, labor force reductions. 
 
In the Indian context, Beena, (2004) presents the policies of economic liberalization adopted 
during the years triggered a sharp increase in mergers between domestically owned 
companies and firms under foreign ownership. Further, it suggests that merger was not a 
route to growth which was dominantly financed through resources acquired from a buoyant 
share market. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show the long-term underperformance of acquiring 
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firms in mergers and they are predominantly cause by the poor post-acquisition performance 
of low book-to-market glamour firms. They interpret this finding as evidence that both 
market and management over extrapolate the bidder’s past performance. 
 
There are studies related to measuring long-term operating performance during pre and post 
merger/acquisition period, Pawaskar (2001) analyzes pre and post merger operating 
performance of 36 acquiring firms during 1992-95, by using ratios of profitability, growth, 
leverage, and liquidity and found that the acquiring firms perform better than industry 
average in terms of profitability. However, it shows that there was no increase in the post-
merger profits compare to main competitors of the acquiring firms. Supplementary, Kumar 
and Rajib (2007) analyze the financial characteristics of fifty-three firms involved in multiple 
mergers during 1993-2002, which is based on industry sectors. The control groups were 
matched on the basis of industry sector and sales in the earliest year of initiation of merger 
activity. They found that average sales, profits and cash flow for a period of ten years notice 
higher for the merger firms as compare to a control group matched by industry and size. 
 
Other relevant studies include, Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry (2006) conclude the post-merger 
abnormal return of bank related companies was significantly larger as compare to industry 
mean in the first 5 years after merger. Paliwal (2010) investigates whether the managers of 
rival firms act to mitigate their agency exposure when one a firms in the industry is subject to 
a takeover attempt. The results indicate that the rival firms in general decrease cash levels and 
free cash flows, reduce operating expenses and capital expenditures and they increase 
leverage in response to a control threat in the industry. Bugeja and Rosa (2008) report that 
payment method choice by acquiring firms before and after this regulatory change to assess 
whether target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities. It is subsequent to the regulatory 
change, there is a significantly higher probability that equity will be offered as consideration 
where target shareholder capital gains are greater. 
 
Further, our study undertake 187 Indian open offers during 2007-10 to find shareholders 
returns in requisites of abnormal returns and security returns variability. It also reports the 
objective wise test results to fulfill the need of study. 
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3.0. Methodology and hypothesis 
3.1. Objectives of the Study 
Anson and Cheung (2009) evidence that the information concerning forthcoming corporate 
takeover is consider as good news for the shareholders of bidding firms but not regarded as 
good news for the shareholders of the target firms. The present study is aimed to examine and 
empirically test the stock earnings during pre and post acquisition period of each select 
sample. It focuses on 187 Indian listing target firms during April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010.  
 
3.2. Method 
The acquisition announcements are very sensitive and informative cum input to the investors 
in the stock market. Thus, there is a need to study the significance of this emerging trend, so 
we examine the signaling effect on share earnings and its impact on the wealth of 
shareholders. In addition to this, compute returns for testing the hypothesis by using theory of 
event study approach. Here, the event window period, over which the market sentiments have 
been observed. BSE-500 Index is used to compute the market returns. 
 
3.2.1. Simple returns of each stock compute for both pre and post acquisition periods by 
using the following formulae:  
                                                                   (1) 
Where, Rit = simple returns of a stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
CPt = closing price of a stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
CPt-1  = previous day closing price of a stock 
 
3.2.2. In order to compute the abnormal returns, index returns compute with the base of BSE-
500, by using the following expression: 
                                                                (2) 
  Where, Rmt = returns for the BSE-Sensex ‘m’ at time‘t’ 
   CPmt = closing index value ‘m’ at time‘t’ 
   CPmt-1 = previous day closing index ‘m’ at time‘t-1’ 
 
3.2.3. Abnormal/Excess returns on stocks compute as follows: 
                                                                                     (3) 
  Where, ARit = excess returns for stock ‘i’ 
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Rit   = simple returns of a stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
Rmt = returns for the BSE-500 ‘m’ at time‘t’  
 
3.2.4. Mean of simple returns on stocks compute as follows: 
             
 
 
                                                                         (4) 
  Where, x  = mean of simple returns   
Rit= simple returns of a stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
   n = sample size 
 
3.2.5. Average abnormal returns for each stock compute by using the following formula: 
                 
 
 
 )                                                             (5) 
  Where, AARt = average abnormal returns at time‘t’ 
   ARit = abnormal returns for stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
   n = sample size 
 
3.2.6. In order to examine the cumulative effect of events, cumulative abnormal returns on 
stocks produce as given below. 
                                                                                     (6) 
  Where, CARt = Cumulative abnormal returns at time‘t’ 
   ARt = abnormal returns for stock ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
 
3.2.7. Security returns variability (SRV) model is used to know the reaction of the market, 
symbolically the model is 
              
 
                                                             (7) 
  Where, SRVit = security returns variability of security ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
   AR
2
it = abnormal returns on security ‘i’ at time‘t’ 
   V (AR) = variance of abnormal returns 
 
3.2.8. Exclusively, compute “Pearson’s Correlation matrix” to observe any correlation sets 
during pre and post acquisition period. The given formula is  
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  Where, r = Correlation                                                                          (8) 
   ∑XY = Sum of the variables of their means 
   ∑X = Sum of variable ‘i’, pre-acquisition 
   ∑Y = Sum of variable ‘j’ post-acquisition 
   ∑X2 = Sum of squared ‘i' mean of stock returns 
   ∑Y2 = Sum of squared ‘j’ mean of stock returns 
   N = Sample size 
 
3.2.9. Finally, we compute Analysis of Variance (ANOVA – one way) for chosen hypothesis 
to find any significant differences among the means of stock returns in both the periods. 
                                                                                (9) 
 
3.3. Hypothesis 
We formulate the hypothesis to test the shareholders earnings in respect of event periods. To 
test the objectives mentioned above, the following hypothesis has been formulated. 
 H1: Post acquisition simple returns observe positive in the short period after the 
immediate announcement 
 H2: Post acquisition abnormal returns notice positive in the short period after the 
immediate announcement 
 H3: Pre acquisition cumulative abnormal returns examine positive in all windows 
before the announcement 
 H4: Difference of means of simple returns observe during pre and post acquisition 
period 
 H5: Difference of means of abnormal returns observe during pre and post acquisition 
period 
 
4.0. Data collection, description and analysis 
4.1. Data Collection 
We collect data from four sources and use as the sample for substantial acquisition of shares 
and takeovers (open offers) in India. The main sample of scripts has been taken from 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), that is announced open offer program 
through open market acquisitions in three objectives over the period from April, 2007 - 
March, 2010 (e.g. Reddy et al., 2011). After selecting the sample, the security prices has been 
11 
 
collected for all the companies going for open market acquisitions in reference to opening 
date (date of commencement). Further, statistical data including daily share prices of select 
sample and index values absorb from the Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. (BSE) official 
website and CMIE Prowess database. 
 
4.2. Sample Description 
The sample size has been described on the basis of availability of information in respect to 
each script as shown in two tabular formats. The description of sample data is expressed in 
Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The sample again divided in to three objectives, namely the “change in control, consolidation 
of holding and substantial acquisition of shares” in reference to SEBI (SAST) Regulations, 
1997.  Table 3 portrays the data into percentage of equity holding and year wise for each 
definition that suits the sample size. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4.3. Data Analysis 
We select only 187 open market acquisitions which the complete information is available in 
respect to opening date, price data and relevant information, etc. during 2007-10. The sample 
has been analyzed into pre and post acquisition event periods. First, compute mean of simple 
returns for each script in the sample. So, in order to test the significance between variables, 
AAR, CAR and SRV has been calculated and apply the one way analysis of variance to find 
any significant difference among the means of returns. Additionally, compute correlation 
matrix to locate any associated sets in stock earnings during pre and post acquisition.  
 
We select both event and odd periods, to test the significance between pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition periods. Further, randomly select the window periods in three months before 
and after the opening date of acquisition. The window periods are T-1, T-3, T-7, T-15, T-30, 
T-45 and T-60. T-1 means that one day before and after the opening date of acquisition, -1 
and +1, whereas T-60 means that sixty days before and after the opening date of acquisition, 
i.e. -60 and +60. Opening date of acquisition is designated as ‘0’. BSE-500 Index is used as a 
12 
 
broad-based market index to calculate the parameters of market model. Further, apply the 
event study approach to insert the above mentioned method for achieving the objective of 
work and the same expresses in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
5.0. Results and discussions 
5.1. Descriptive statistics for simple returns 
First, we present the descriptive statistics for simple returns in Table 4 and observe that 
simple returns reports positive in all the event windows during pre-acquisition and notices 
0.73 as highest figure on -30
th
 window. Further, simple returns are not creamy, though those 
are significantly affirmative in short period after the immediate announcement of acquisition, 
i.e. 0.18, 0.25 and 0.17 on +1, +3 and +7 windows respectively. So, we accept the hypothesis 
H1 that meets the criteria by noticing positive earnings in the post-acquisition short period. 
Specifically, we notice that similar percentage of scripts with positive earnings observes 
before and after the immediate acquisition, 57.75% on -1 and +1.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Hence, post-acquisition shareholders earnings lower than pre-acquisition and becoming 
negative from +15
th
 window. It evidences that open offers would be generous positive results 
in the short period, but lower than pre-acquisition (see Figure 2). Since, all open offers made 
payment in the form of cash and this can be a valuable regional contribution from the 
emerging countries, like India in ‘takeovers and open offers investigation’. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
5.2. Descriptive statistics for abnormal returns 
Table 5 tabulates descriptive statistics for abnormal returns to interpret the hypothesis H2 and 
H3. Likewise simple returns, here we convey AAR is positive in all pre-acquisition windows 
and notices similar earnings in the short period after the immediate announcement. So, we 
accept the hypothesis H2 because of optimistic AAR observe in the short period, i.e. 0.61, 
0.53 and 0.14 on +1, +3 and +7 windows respectively. Since, AAR is becoming negative 
from +15
th
 window which is parallel to simple returns.  On the other hand, CAR is positive in 
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all event windows before the acquisition, further it views seemingly akin in AAR. So, we 
accept the hypothesis H3 due to positive earnings in all pre-acquisition windows. 
Exclusively, our results notices that the highest percentage of scripts with positive returns 
notices in the periods, 59.89% on -30 and 57.22% on +1. Interestingly, analogous percentage 
of scripts with positive earnings found in both simple and abnormal returns, i.e. day after the 
acquisition, +1. Surprisingly, we found SRV is moving proportionate to AAR and CAR in 
both the periods (see Figure 2). Generally, SRV moves equivalent to AAR. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
In addition to the above statistics, we report correlation matrix for both stock and abnormal 
returns during pre and post acquisition period. Unluckily, we have not found any significant 
associated sets at 95% confidence level, though some sets are near to 1. Amazingly, one set 
on -45
th
 window for stock returns presents ‘perfectly not correlated’, r=0 (refer Annexure). 
 
5.3. Analysis of variance (ANOVA – one way) results 
Table 6 represents the results of one way analysis of variance for both stock and abnormal 
returns in order to find any significant difference among the means of select groups, namely 
pre and post acquisition earnings. Panel A describes the inference in regard to pre and post 
acquisition simple returns. Therefore, P-value 0.00405 is less than the significant α level 
0.05, i.e. 95% confidence level. It evidences that there is no momentous distinction among 
the means of simple returns, so we reject the hypothesis H4.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
On the other hand, Panel B discusses the statistical results for abnormal returns during pre 
and post acquisition period. Therefore, P-value 0.01219 is less than the significant α level 
0.05, i.e. 95% confidence level. Likewise simple returns, we reject the hypothesis H5 and it 
inferences that there is no considerable discrepancy among the means of abnormal returns. 
From the above results, describes that there is no amount of variation among the means of 
neither simple returns nor abnormal returns (AAR). Hence, open offers would not be a 
synergetic option for existing shareholders, who wants to be exit or sell after acquisition of 
target firm shares by an identified acquirer. Further, it would be a great empirical support for 
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both Western and Asian countries, then it could be an imminent contribution on Indian open 
offers and shareholders earnings. 
 
5.4. Objective wise results for simple and abnormal returns 
To achieve the second face of objective of study, Table 7 reports objective wise results for 
simple and abnormal returns (see Figure 3). Functionally, there are three objectives, namely 
change in control, consolidation of holding and substantial acquisition. Comparatively, 
objective III: substantial acquisition notices superior earnings via simple, AAR and CAR 
during post-acquisition short period. Interestingly, merely the objective I: change in control 
presents affirmative earnings in all pre-acquisition windows. Conversely, no objective such I, 
II or III do performance during post-acquisition is finer than pre-acquisition in all respects. 
Lastly, we believe that the conjecture would assist consultants, financial advisors, M&A 
advisors and shareholders groups for selecting “objective of acquisition/open offer” in the 
Indian context.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
6.0. Conclusions 
The present research paper examines the impact of open offer announcements by bidding 
firms on the stock earnings of Indian listed target firms. We find that there exist significantly 
negative returns during post-acquisition period. In contrast, observe that AAR and CAR 
notices negative returns during post-acquisition, conversely positive in the short period. We 
would like to highlight a statement that ‘stock returns are greater than market returns on the 
day after the immediate acquisition announcement’. Previous studies conclude, like positive 
abnormal returns around takeover announcements (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), bidder returns 
(Chang, 1998) and recent study in the Asian market, negative average residuals around M&A 
announcement for target firm shareholders (Wong and Cheung, 2009). Further, our study is 
the evidence from BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) context, which 
open offers have not become velvety for target firm shareholders in the Indian perspective; on 
the contrary open offers favor retail shareholders in the post-acquisition short period.  
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The changes in share prices prior to the acquisition or after acquisition could be the 
misinterpretation of stock information including leakage, unauthorized, etc. or acquiring 
prices which may be variants from market sensitivity. Though, there are limitations to this 
research work. The generalization of results based on the data obtained mainly from 
government official stock exchange BSE, that some of the data is not available and not 
consider for the study. The sample period 2007-10 is not long enough, so the acquisition 
effect if any, on target firms is not perceptible. During global financial crisis, the market 
sentiments and investor perception towards stocks might not favorable and not considered. 
 
We believe that the research involvement would be offering some inputs to investment 
bankers, M&A advisory firms and government, to protect the interest of investors during 
various corporate announcements. Finally, we suggest that intent behind the strategic 
acquisitions, effect on operating performance of bidding firms and organizational change are 
key areas that deserve future research and would require more evidence from Asian markets. 
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Table 1: Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers, 1997-2009 
[Amount in Rs. (Crores)] 
Year Open Offers Total Automatic 
exemption 
Objective 
Change in 
Control of 
Management 
Consolidation 
of Holdings 
Substantial 
Acquisition 
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount 
1997-98 17 143 10 340 13 96 40 578 93 3502 
1998-99 29 100 25 587 12 327 66 1014 201 1888 
1999-00 43 260 9 71 23 130 75 461 252 4677 
2000-01 70 1140 5 189 2 42 77 1372 248 4873 
2001-02 54 1756 26 1815 1 39 81 3610 276 2539 
2002-03 46 3814 40 2573 2 1 88 6389 238 2428 
2003-04 38 395 16 197 11 1003 65 1595 171 1436 
2004-05 35 3503 12 165 14 964 61 4632 212 6958 
2005-06 78 3252 9 119 15 709 102 4078 245 17132 
2006-07 66 6771 15 4498 6 83 87 11352 223 18608 
2007-08 78 11657 28 13254 8 3796 114 28706 232 6458 
2008-09 80 3713 13 598 6 400 99 4711 227 10502 
Source: SEBI Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Securities Market, 2009 
 
 
Table 2: Description of sample data 
  
2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 Total 
i. Number of open offers 76 113 115 304 
ii. Number of closed offers 76 110 107 293 
iii. Number of pending offers & not to 
proceed 
- 3 8 11 
iv. Non-listed and unavailability of data of 
companies 
30 35 41 106 
Sample size 46 75 66 187 
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Table 3: Objective wise sample data 
Quintiles  
(Percentage of Equity 
capital) 
Objective Grand 
Sample 
Size Change in Control
* Consolidation of Holding
# 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares
@ 
2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 Total 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 Total 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 Total 
Below = 10.00%  1  1 1 2 1 4     5 
10.01 - 15.00% 2  1 3 1  1 2  1 1 2 7 
15.01 - 20.00% 20 43 32 95 7 6 11 24 5 6 5 16 135 
20.01 - 25.00% 2 6 1 9 1 3 1 5  1 1 2 16 
25.01 - 30.00% 4 1 3 8  1 2 3     11 
Above 30.00% 1 2 4 7 2  1 3  2 1 3 13 
Total Sample Size 29 53 41 123 12 12 17 41 5 10 8 23 187 
*
Change in Control: According to SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares & Takeovers) Regulations, 1997, the term ‘control’ has been defined under Regulation 2(1) (c), “A 
person with a majority stake may not necessarily have control over the management of a company”. It refers to a transfer of ownership in which a new person or entity obtains a 
fifty percent or greater ownership interest. It includes the “right to appoint majority of the directors or to control management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or 
persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements 
or in any other manner”.  
#
Consolidation of Holding: An acquirer who is having 75% shares or voting rights of a target company can acquire further shares or voting rights only after making a public 
announcement specifying the number of shares to be acquired through open offer from the shareholders of a target company. 
@ 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares: According to Regulation 10 and 11, “When an “acquirer” takes over the control of the “target company”, it is termed as takeover. When an 
acquirer acquires “substantial quantity of shares or voting rights” of the Target Company, it results into substantial acquisition of shares. The term “Substantial” which is used like 
5%, 10% and 15% etc. described in the act. It includes: 
(i) Direct acquisition in a listed company to which the takeover regulations apply, and 
(ii) Indirect acquisition by virtue of the acquisition of companies, whether listed or unlisted, in India or abroad. 
**
Acquirer: An acquirer means any individual/company/any other legal entity which intends to acquire or acquires substantial quantity of shares or voting rights of Target 
Company or acquires or agrees to acquire control over the target company. It includes persons acting in concert (PAC) with the acquirer. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for simple returns during pre and post acquisition 
 Pre-acquisition period Post-acquisition period 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
Mean 0.50 0.56 0.73 0.22 0.39 0.43 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.17 -0.11 -0.57 -0.24 -0.62 
Standard Error 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.35 0.27 0.29 0.30 
Median 0.03 0.26 0.29 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.05 -0.13 -0.90 -0.30 -0.79 
Mode 3.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation 4.00 3.94 3.33 3.13 3.06 3.13 2.87 3.06 3.21 3.49 4.82 3.73 3.97 4.13 
Sample Variance 15.97 15.56 11.10 9.79 9.38 9.77 8.23 9.34 10.28 12.16 23.26 13.91 15.77 17.05 
Kurtosis 0.66 4.14 -0.03 0.57 0.07 0.76 0.70 8.61 7.65 4.41 2.30 0.68 3.08 2.02 
Skewness 0.57 0.77 -0.08 0.25 0.29 0.58 0.38 1.29 1.03 0.82 0.43 0.60 0.85 0.28 
Range 26.23 33.40 18.91 19.93 16.66 17.05 15.89 28.03 29.49 27.97 37.29 21.66 30.33 31.83 
Minimum -10.47 -11.42 -8.94 -8.39 -6.73 -4.99 -5.89 -8.08 -9.50 -9.97 -17.37 -8.51 -10.94 -16.98 
Maximum 15.76 21.98 9.97 11.54 9.93 12.06 10.00 19.95 19.99 18.00 19.92 13.16 19.39 14.85 
Sum 93.54 104.41 136.08 40.82 72.60 79.56 49.61 34.34 46.35 31.11 -21.24 -107.16 -44.49 -115.89 
Percentage of scripts with positive returns 51.87 55.61 61.50 53.48 56.15 54.55 57.75 57.75 54.01 55.61 48.13 39.57 47.06 43.32 
No of observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for abnormal returns during pre and post acquisition 
 Pre-acquisition period Post-acquisition period 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
Mean (AAR) 0.36 0.41 0.79 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.61 0.53 0.14 -0.22 -0.55 -0.25 -0.45 
Standard Error 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Median -0.06 0.16 0.70 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.43 0.33 0.29 0.00 -0.27 -0.81 -0.72 -0.53 
Mode 3.80 0.60 0.56 3.33 0.20 0.34 -6.09 0.07 -1.48 -1.11 13.68 -1.65 -1.14 -0.49 
Standard Deviation 4.18 4.36 3.40 3.44 3.24 3.43 3.35 3.49 3.69 3.74 4.84 3.84 4.08 4.06 
Sample Variance 17.46 18.98 11.56 11.83 10.50 11.75 11.26 12.16 13.64 13.99 23.47 14.75 16.64 16.51 
Kurtosis 1.57 2.33 0.32 0.82 -0.12 1.90 0.96 5.09 6.39 4.60 1.94 0.56 2.53 1.07 
Skewness 0.66 0.50 -0.03 -0.15 0.14 0.43 0.14 1.07 1.22 0.59 0.40 0.40 0.69 0.21 
Range 26.99 32.23 20.75 22.19 15.88 25.52 22.25 27.84 31.62 32.18 33.48 21.33 31.29 27.74 
Minimum -10.13 -11.13 -11.50 -11.90 -7.70 -11.58 -11.85 -7.43 -9.91 -15.52 -13.76 -9.10 -11.81 -13.12 
Maximum 16.86 21.11 9.24 10.29 8.18 13.95 10.40 20.40 21.70 16.66 19.72 12.23 19.48 14.62 
Cumulative (CAR) 66.46 76.65 148.36 34.50 45.39 73.80 69.15 113.73 98.66 26.76 -41.37 -102.09 -46.62 -84.15 
Percentage of scripts with positive returns 47.59 53.48 59.89 51.87 49.20 49.73 54.55 57.22 53.48 49.73 45.99 39.57 42.25 43.85 
Security Returns Variability (SRV) 0.0072 0.0089 0.0545 0.0029 0.0056 0.0133 0.0121 0.0304 0.0204 0.0015 0.0021 0.0202 0.0037 0.0123 
No of observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
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Table 6: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA - one way) results 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Panel A: Simple returns  
Between Groups 396.39 13 30.49123 2.35111 0.00405
** 
1.72391 
Within Groups 33770.97 2604 12.96888    
Total 34167.35 2617     
Panel A: Abnormal returns  
Between Groups 396.53 13 30.50244 2.08837 0.01219
** 
1.72391 
Within Groups 38033.61 2604 14.60584    
Total 38430.14 2617         
** Reject the hypothesis, H4 and H5 at 95% confidence level, because P-value is less than α level 0.05, i.e. P<0.05 
** Accept the hypothesis, H5 because P-value is greater than α level, 0.01, i.e. P>0.01; conversely reject H4, because P<0.01 
** Accept the hypothesis, H4 and H5, because P-value is greater than α level 0.001, i.e. P>0.001 
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Table 7: Objective wise simple and abnormal returns 
Objective Pre-acquisition period Post-acquisition period 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
Objective I - Change in Control (No of observations: 123) 
Mean 0.20 0.52 0.63 0.11 0.62 0.35 0.55 -0.03 0.40 0.07 -0.29 -0.77 -0.70 -0.69 
Percentage of scripts with positive returns 50.41 54.47 57.72 54.47 60.16 54.47 60.16 53.66 52.03 54.47 45.53 36.59 39.02 43.90 
AAR -0.02 0.28 0.61 0.02 0.41 0.32 0.50 0.56 0.48 0.16 -0.44 -0.73 -0.75 -0.69 
CAR -2.01 33.86 75.23 2.67 50.89 39.54 61.88 68.78 59.18 20.20 -54.09 -89.35 -92.58 -85.23 
Objective II - Consolidation of Holding (No of observations: 41) 
Mean 1.50 0.91 0.20 0.74 -0.25 0.21 -0.65 0.42 -0.08 0.39 0.42 -0.24 0.63 -0.54 
Percentage of scripts with positive returns 60.98 63.41 60.98 56.10 48.78 56.10 46.34 60.98 58.54 60.98 56.10 39.02 60.98 36.59 
AAR 1.28 0.66 0.32 1.01 -0.44 -0.02 -0.30 0.48 0.74 0.24 0.15 -0.44 0.78 0.06 
CAR 52.41 26.91 13.25 41.45 -17.85 -0.91 -12.46 19.54 30.14 9.96 6.25 -18.21 32.08 2.44 
Objective III - Substantial acquisition (No of observations: 23) 
Mean 0.31 0.15 2.18 -0.11 0.32 1.20 0.41 0.90 0.03 0.29 -0.13 -0.14 0.71 -0.38 
Percentage of scripts with positive returns 52.17 47.83 82.61 43.48 47.83 52.17 65.22 69.57 56.52 52.17 47.83 52.17 65.22 47.83 
AAR 0.70 0.69 2.60 -0.42 0.54 1.53 0.86 1.11 0.41 -0.15 0.28 0.24 0.60 -0.06 
CAR 16.06 15.89 59.88 -9.63 12.35 35.18 19.73 25.42 9.34 -3.39 6.47 5.46 13.88 -1.36 
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Time series of daily returns 
Pre- Acquisition event period Post -Acquisition event period 
Event date 
t=0 
Opening date for Acquisition 
Figure 1: Event Period 
-60, -45, -30, -15, -7, -3, -1 trading day +1, +3, +7, +15, +30, +45, +60  trading day 
 
 
Figure 2: Simple, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
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Figure 3: Objective wise simple returns 
 
 
-1.00 
-0.50 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
Objective wise simple returns 
Change in Control Consolidation of Holding Substantial acquisition 
26 
 
 
 
Annexure I: Correlation matrix for simple returns during pre and post acquisition 
Event 
window 
Pre-acquisition period Post-acquisition period 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
-60 1                           
-45 0.060 1                         
-30 -0.020 -0.071 1                       
-15 -0.073 -0.008 -0.024 1                     
-7 -0.143 -0.096 -0.017 0.126 1                   
-3 0.052 0.000
* 
0.023 0.085 0.037 1                 
-1 -0.041 0.037 -0.066 -0.036 0.033 0.093 1               
1 -0.053 0.028 0.014 -0.002 -0.083 0.158 0.051 1             
3 -0.033 0.079 -0.029 0.083 0.050 -0.051 0.146 0.328 1           
7 -0.066 -0.041 -0.013 -0.155 -0.043 0.038 0.012 0.169 0.095 1         
15 0.015 -0.006 -0.016 -0.007 0.040 0.066 -0.087 -0.149 -0.084 0.091 1       
30 0.074 -0.076 0.014 -0.062 -0.102 -0.038 0.023 0.073 0.038 -0.018 0.025 1     
45 0.058 0.004 0.033 0.015 0.023 -0.030 0.001 0.017 -0.012 0.075 -0.087 -0.033 1   
60 -0.005 -0.004 -0.149 0.040 -0.084 0.052 -0.002 0.014 -0.043 0.020 -0.028 -0.073 -0.026 1 
* if r=1, perfectly positively correlated, r=0, not correlated and r=-1, perfectly negatively correlated at 95% confidence level 
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Annexure II: Correlation matrix for abnormal returns during pre and post acquisition 
Event 
window 
Pre-acquisition period Post-acquisition period 
-60 -45 -30 -15 -7 -3 -1 1 3 7 15 30 45 60 
-60 1                           
-45 0.128 1                         
-30 -0.072 -0.047 1                       
-15 -0.021 -0.058 -0.069 1                     
-7 -0.166 -0.142 -0.018 0.032 1                   
-3 -0.048 -0.029 0.082 0.004 0.060 1                 
-1 0.048 0.039 0.038 0.063 -0.045 0.130 1               
1 -0.030 0.106 0.024 0.039 -0.026 0.112 0.061 1             
3 -0.035 0.034 -0.059 0.146 0.001 -0.094 0.162 0.218 1           
7 -0.054 -0.011 0.068 -0.028 -0.040 -0.048 0.036 0.092 0.101 1         
15 0.024 -0.032 -0.029 0.041 -0.025 -0.072 -0.082 -0.184 -0.034 0.093 1       
30 0.061 -0.050 0.076 -0.076 -0.106 0.048 0.021 0.037 0.123 -0.085 0.012 1     
45 0.066 0.025 -0.016 0.028 -0.013 -0.111 -0.045 0.045 -0.043 0.057 -0.064 -0.078 1   
60 0.037 -0.036 -0.135 -0.003 -0.150 0.067 0.026 0.016 0.028 -0.018 0.046 0.080 0.057 1 
* if r=1, perfectly positively correlated, r=0, not correlated and r=-1, perfectly negatively correlated at 95% confidence level 
 
 
 
 
 
